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Abstract
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and
moral hazard, and can therefore increase lending and reduce default rates. To test these
predictions, we construct a new international data set on private credit bureaus and public
credit registers. We find that bank lending is higher and credit risk is lower in countries
where lenders share information, regardless of the private or public nature of the
information sharing mechanism. We also find that public intervention is more likely where
private arrangements have not arisen spontaneously and creditor rights are poorly protected.
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A large body of literature shows that asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders can prevent the efficient allocation of credit. Lenders are often unable to observe the
characteristics of borrowers, including the riskiness of their investment projects, and this
induces adverse selection problems. Lenders may also be unable to control the actions that
borrowers take after receiving a loan. A borrower may relax his effort to prevent default or
hide the proceeds of his investment to keep from having to repay his debts. Even a solvent
borrower may try to avoid repayment if the lender cannot observe or sanction his actions.  The
consequence is that lenders may ration credit or charge high borrowing rates.
It is often assumed that the only way lenders can overcome these informational
problems is to produce information about their customers via screening and monitoring. For
instance, they can interview applicants, visit their business before and after granting the loan,
and gather information from public records. If lenders operate on a large scale, these data can
be used for statistical risk management to grant and price loans on the basis of past
performance.
Most of the literature neglects exchange of information with other lenders as an
alternative way to learn about one’s own customers. This exchange can be voluntary or
imposed by regulation. When it occurs spontaneously, it is effected by information brokers,
known as “credit bureaus”, which operate on the principle of reciprocity, collecting, filing and
distributing the information supplied voluntarily by their members. In many countries a great
deal of informational exchange also occurs via “public credit registers”. These are generally
managed by central banks, with compulsory reporting of data on borrowers which are then
processed and returned to the lenders.
Previous theoretical research, summarized in Section 2, shows that information sharing
between lenders can foster credit activity and increase borrowers’ incentives to repay, but no
empirical investigation of such effects exists to this date. To fill this gap, in this paper we use a
new international database to test if the presence of credit bureaus or public credit registers
increases lending activity and reduces defaults.
Sections 3 and 4 describe our data set, which we collected via questionnaires directed
to private credit bureaus and central banks. We document that borrower coverage and the type
of data exchanged vary considerably over time and between countries. Lenders commonly
exchange data about past defaults or arrears. Sometimes they also share data about customers'
outstanding liabilities, maturities, and details about borrowers’ credit history. In Section 5 we
test if private and public information sharing affect bank lending, and in Section 6 whether they
also affect credit risk. We find that information sharing is associated with broader credit
markets and lower credit risk.The empirical analysis reveals that private and public information
sharing arrangements have no differential effect on credit market performance. One way to
interpret this finding is that public credit registers and private credit bureaus are substitutes.
This leads us to investigate directly whether the absence of private credit bureaus prompts
regulators to establish public credit registers or to widen the scope of their operation. Probit
and Tobit regressions reported in Section 7 show that these hypotheses are consistent with the
data. Section 8 summarizes our main findings.8
2. Review of Theoretical Models
Recent theoretical research suggests a threefold effect of lenders’ exchange of
information about borrowers. First, credit bureaus improve banks’ knowledge of applicants’
characteristics and permit more accurate prediction of repayment probability. This allows
lenders to target and price their loans better, easing adverse selection problems. Second, credit
bureaus reduce the informational rents that banks could otherwise extract from their
customers. They tend to level the informational playing field within the credit market and force
lenders to price loans more competitively. Lower interest rates increase borrowers’ net return
and augment their incentive to perform. Third, credit bureaus work as a borrower discipline
device: every borrower knows that if he defaults his reputation with all other potential lenders
is ruined, cutting him off from credit or making it more expensive. This mechanism also
heightens borrowers’ incentive to repay, reducing moral hazard.
Here we review these three effects of information sharing. In the pure adverse selection
model developed by Pagano and Jappelli (1993), information sharing improves the pool of
borrowers, decreases defaults and reduces the average interest rate. In the model, each bank
has private information about the credit worthiness of local residents but no information about
immigrants, who therefore face adverse selection. If banks exchange their private information
about residents, they can lend safely to immigrants as well, so the default rate decreases. The
effect on lending is ambiguous, however. The volume of lending may increase or decrease,
because when banks exchange information about borrowers’ types, the implied increase in
lending to safe borrowers may fail to compensate for the reduction in lending to risky types.
Banking competition tends to strengthen the positive effect of information sharing on lending:
when credit markets are contestable,information sharing reduces informational rents and
increases competition, which in turn leads to greater lending.
1
The other two effects arise in the presence of moral hazard. Information sharing can
reinforce borrowers’ incentives to perform, either via a reduction of  banks’ rents or through a
disciplinary effect. The exchange of information between banks reduces the informational rents
that banks can extract from their clients within lending relationships. Padilla and Pagano (1997)
make this point in the context of a two-period model where banks are endowed with private
information about their borrowers. This informational advantage confers to banks some market
power over their customers, and thereby generates a hold-up problem: since banks are
expected to charge predatory rates in the future, borrowers exert low effort to perform,
leading to high default and interest rates, and possibly to the collapse of the credit market. By
committing to exchange information about borrowers’ types, they restrain their own future
ability to extract informational rents. This reduces the probability of default of each borrower
and the interest rate he is charged, and increases total lending relative to the regime without
information sharing.
                                               
1  This model also delivers predictions about lenders’ incentives to create a credit bureau. Lenders have a
greater incentive to share information when the mobility of credit seekers is high and when the potential
demand for loans is large. Technical innovations that reduce the cost of filing, organizing and distributing
information should foster credit bureaus’ activity. Banking competition, by contrast, might inhibit the
appearance of credit bureaus: with free entry, a bank that supplies information about its customers to a
credit bureau is in effect helping other lenders to compete more aggressively. This reduces the expected gain
from information sharing and could deter the creation of a credit bureau. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) bring
international and historical evidence to bear on these predictions.9
An effect on incentives exists even when there is no hold-up problem. This effect is
present when banks, instead of exchanging information about borrowers’ types, communicate
to each other data about past defaults. Padilla and Pagano (1999) show that this creates a
disciplinary effect. When banks share default information, default becomes a signal of bad
quality for outside banks and carries the penalty of higher interest rates. To avoid this penalty,
entrepreneurs exert more effort, leading to lower default and interest rates and to more
lending.
2
In this model, disclosing information about borrowers’ quality, instead, has no effect on
default and interest rates, in contrast with the result of Padilla and Pagano (1997). Ex-ante
competition is assumed to eliminate the informational rents of banks anyway, so that their
customers’ overall interest burden cannot be reduced further. As a result, when information
about their quality is shared, borrowers have no reason to change their effort level, and
equilibrium default and interest rates stay unchanged. Information sharing about borrowers’
characteristics can even reduce lending. When they share information, banks lose all future
informational rents and therefore require a higher probability of repayment to be willing to
lend. So the credit market may collapse in situations in which it would be viable under no
information sharing.
This suggests that sharing data on defaults rather than borrowers’ characteristics can
have quite different effects on the probability of default. The disciplinary effect arises only from
the exchange of default information. To the extent that banks also share data on borrowers’
characteristics, they actually reduce the disciplinary effect of information sharing: a high-
quality borrower will not be concerned about his default being reported to outside banks if
these are also told that he is a high-quality client. But, as discussed above, exchanging
information about borrowers’ characteristics may reduce adverse selection or temper hold-up
problems in credit markets, and thereby reduce default rates.
On the whole, all three models agree on the prediction that information sharing (in one
form or another) reduces default rates, whereas the prediction concerning its effect on lending
is less clear-cut. However, even the prediction about default is unambiguous only if referred to
the probability of default of an individual borrower. When one considers the average default
rate, the prediction may be overturned by composition effects. Suppose that information
sharing gives access to credit to lower-grade borrowers. Even though each borrower’s
probability of default is lower, the aggregate default rate may increase because the relative
weight of  lower-grade borrowers increases. Since the data used in the empirical tests in the
next sections concern aggregate measures of the default rate, this composition effect may
introduce a bias against the prediction of the models.
The empirical evidence on these predictions will be presented in Section 4. Before
turning to the evidence, we proceed to describe the main features of private and public
information sharing arrangements, and their diffusion around the world.
                                               
2  In this model there is no holdup problem because initially banks have no private information about credit
seekers, and ex ante competition dissipates any rents from information acquired in the lending relation.10
3.  Private Information Sharing Arrangements
In a number of countries, lenders (banks, finance companies, credit card companies,
retailers, suppliers extending trade credit) routinely share information on the creditworthiness
of their borrowers through credit bureaus, information brokers that in some cases are set up
and owned by the lenders themselves and in others operated independently for profit by a third
party. Lenders supply the bureau with data about their customers. The bureau collates this
information with data from other sources (courts, public registers, tax authorities, etc.) and
compiles a file on each borrower. The lenders that contribute data can later obtain a return
flow of consolidated data about a credit applicant by requesting a “credit report” from the
bureau. Nowadays this two-way flow of data between lenders and the bureau is effected
electronically.
It is the exchange of information between lenders that distinguishes a credit bureau
from other agencies that collect and process valuable information from public sources and
private investigators. Credit bureaus often do collect and process such data, but this is not their
distinguishing characteristic.
Lenders who provide their private information to credit bureaus are granted access to the
common database insofar as the data provided are timely and accurate. Credit bureaus are
exposed to a potential conflict of interest, especially when they are owned by the lenders
themselves: each lender would like to exploit the information provided by other lenders
without disclosing his own. This explains why sanctions are invariably threatened to any
credit granter who fails to supply data or provides inaccurate information. Sanctions range
from fines to loss of membership and hence denial of access to the bureau’s files. In other
words, credit bureaus are based on the principle of reciprocity, which is generally stated in
the contractual agreement between the bureau and credit grantors.
3 Most credit grantors do
supply their information regularly, particularly those that have accounts receivable on tape.
Around the world, arrangements of this type are found both in the household credit
market and in business lending, in varying degrees and with different institutional features.
These are described and documented below.
3.1. Personal Loans and Small Business Loans
Personal and small business loans are characterized by a large number of applicants
whose desired loan size is not large enough to warrant individual assessment. In these markets,
screening can benefit greatly from statistical analysis of applicants’ characteristics and credit
histories as predictors of repayment, and such analysis is feasible precisely because of the large
number of standard loans. Credit bureaus, which pool data from many lenders and for several
years, own the ideal database for estimating statistical models of risk management, which
explains why credit bureaus have generally originated precisely in the consumer credit market.
They are now increasingly active in the small business and trade credit markets as well.
                                               
3  There are exceptions, however. At one time, American Express declined to share its information with the
credit bureaus, but because it was willing to buy reports in large quantities, the bureaus kept on selling
reports to that firm. This situation later changed and American Express now provides data on its own
customers.11
Figure 1
A Standard Credit Report on an Individual
Source: Credit Reference Association of Australia Limited
FILE NUMBER – 64610042 REF 3664-3186
HARRISON,THOMAS,RONALD,M,M,KRISTINA
SUBJECT BORN – 100850,LIC NO-2421PS
SPOUSE BORN – 250164





130886 MRT – GEZEBO WHOLESALERS PL (IN LIQ.) CC-64608113
MEMBER DEFAULT REPORTS
DATE  NAME AC AMNT DF REF. NO. DTR PAID
140388 STANDARD CHART LOSS REC NSW L 5431 PD LLR0040LS MRT
040687 AGC FIVE DK NSW L 7314 R L1070515135 MRT
260186 ESANDA ADMIN SYD NSW RM 6448 RL 241174159 T&K
JUDGEMENTS
DATE  NAME AMNT DF PLAINT. NO. DTR PAID
150487 9037 DJ 15648/86/METN MRT
NOTE: ALLEGED DEBT(S) MAY HAVE BEEN PAID SINCE RECORDED, OR ARE POSSIBLY
DISPUTED. CHECK WITH CREDITORS FOR CONFIRMATION.
CREDIT ENQUIRIES
DATE NAME AC AMNT DTR REFERENCE  NUMBER
140688 CITYCORP FIN HURTSVILLE NSW. L 8727 T&K
131287 AGC FIVE DOCKK NSW L 8700 T&K
231087 JAOHN’S MOTOR NSW HM 7000 T&K
111186 WESTPAC WESTERN NSW CC 0 MRT
221185 ITICORP FIN SYDNEY NSW L 1717 MRT
150685 PERMANENT FIN CORP NSW HB 15300 MRT
310784 AGC FIVE DOCK NSW L 18000 MRT
230484 ESANDA ADMIN VIC RM 19000 MRT
KEY TO THE INITIALS USED IN THE REPORT
AC - ACCOUNT TYPE L - LEASE ACCOUNT
M - MONTHLY ACCOUNT HM - HIRE PURCHASE MOTOR VEHICLE
T - TERMS ACCOUNT RM  - REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
HB - HIRE PURCHASE BOAT CC - CREDIT CARD
AMNT - AMOUNT OWING OR APPLIED FOR DF - REASON FOR REPORTING
PD - REGULAR PAYMENT DEFAULT R - REPOSSESSION
RL - REPOSSESION LOSS DJ - DISTRICT COURT JUDGEMENT
LA - LEGAL ACTION DTR - WHO IS THE DEBTOR
MRT - DEBTOR IS MR. T. HARRISON T&K - DEBTOR IS THOMAS AND KRISTINA12
Figure 2
A standard credit report on a company
Source: Credit Reference Association of Australia Limited




DATE INCORP REGISTRATION NUMBER STATE REGISTERED
180285 234322-78 NSW
CORPORATE AFFAIRS SEARCH
DATE DATE LAS RETURN SHARED ISSUE PAID CAPITAL
130688 101286 1,000,000 $840,000
DIRECTORSHIP DETAILS
DATE FILE NUMBER
100688 THOMAS GARDNER CN-26579545
100688 SAMUEL HARVEY CN-88502222
NOTE: DIRECTOHIP DETAILS WERE OBTAINED FROM CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMM. RECORDS
MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS
DATE NAME SHARES HELD
100688 CAROLINE NOMINEES P/L 385,000
100688 THOMAS GARDNER AN ASOCIATES P/L 422,000





DATE NAME AC AMNT DF REFERENCE NO. PAID
020787 AGC COMMERCIAL LEASE L 6000 LA 45903 1186P
NOTE: ALLEGED DEBT(S) MAY HAVE BEEN PAID SINCE RECORDED, OR ARE POSSIBLY
DISPUTED. CHECK WITH CREDITORS FOR CONFIRMATION.
SECURITIES
DATE CREDITORS TYPE AMT SECURITY REFERENCE
100188 STATE BANK OF NSW RM 387900 LAND PENRITH 323425362
CREDIT ENQUIRIES
DATE NAME AC AMNT
130488 CORPORATE LEASING SERV NSW L 185000
180787 J.B.C. IMPORT AGENCY VIC M 20000
KEY TO THE INITIALS USED IN THE REPORT
AC - ACCOUNT TYPE L - LEASE ACCOUNT
M - MONTHLY ACCOUNT DF - REASON FOR REPORTING
RM  - REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE LA - LEGAL ACTION
AMNT - AMOUNT OWING OR APPLIED FOR13
A credit bureau can issue several kinds of credit report, depending on the information
gathered, the type of credit application (consumer credit, house mortgage, small business loan,
etc.) and, most importantly, the amount of detail requested by the lender. Reports range from
simple statements of past defaults or arrears - “black” or “negative” data - to detailed reports
on the applicant's assets and liabilities, guarantees, debt maturity structure, pattern of
repayments, employment and family history - “white” or “positive” data. Naturally the price of
a credit report depends on the amount of detail. Prices for basic credit reports are currently
quite low, averaging about 1 dollar in the United States and the United Kingdom, 2 dollars in
Italy, and more than 3 dollars for local credit bureaus in Argentina.
Figures 1 and 2 give examples of the most basic type of credit report, reproduced from
a publication of the largest credit bureau in Australia, which only collects and reports negative
information. Figure 1 shows an individual credit file for a person with several credit problems:
three members of the bureau reported default, there was a debt judgment, and he appears as
director of a failed company. The bottom part of the report shows previous queries to the
bureau by various lenders. Figure 2 refers to a small company. It shows the main shareholders
and directors, with cross references to the individual files that the bureaus has recorded in their
names. The company has been reported as insolvent by a bureau member and has pledged a
security over its assets to a bank.
The more sophisticated credit bureaus also use statistical models to produce and sell
“credit scoring” services, by which they rate borrowers according to characteristics and credit
history. Such scores were initially developed by credit grantors mainly for deciding on
applications. Where positive information is also available, the models are now intensively also
used to promote financial instruments, price loans, and set and manage credit limits.
To gather more information about their operations around the world, we sent a
questionnaire (reported in the Appendix) to credit bureaus in 49 countries.
4 We have received
responses from credit bureaus in 39 countries; for 4 more, we obtained data from other sources
(Internet sites, published information, etc.).
5 The data obtained are reported in Table 1, which
displays, by country, the year in which credit bureaus were first established, the type of
information exchanged (black or white) and the number of credit reports issued by credit
bureaus.
The table shows that in some countries lenders exchange a massive amount of negative
and positive information in the consumer credit market: Canada, the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan, Germany, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland have the highest number of
credit reports per person, and lenders have exchanged information for decades at least and in
many cases the better part of a century. Credit bureaus have also operated for several decades
in Argentina, Brazil, Finland, the Netherlands, and Australia but on a smaller scale. In Italy
credit bureaus are a relatively new phenomenon, but have taken on growing importance in
recent years. In some Latin American and Asian countries, credit bureaus are in their infancy,
either non-existent or operating on a small scale and exchanging mainly black information.
                                               
4  The list of countries is given in Tables 1 and 2 and is the same as in La Porta et al. (1997). This choice is
dictated by the need to merge our data on information sharing with data on other institutional determinants
of lending and default.
5  Detailed information on European countries is reported in a background paper (Jappelli and Pagano, 1999).14
Table 1
Private Credit Bureaus around the World
Figures are based on a questionnaire sent to the main credit bureaus in each country, whose names are not
reported for reasons of confidentiality. When two or more credit bureaus responded for the same country,
the information was merged as follows. The starting date refers to the oldest credit bureau in the country.
The type of information shared refers to the 1990s and is defined as “black” (B) if it refers to defaults and
arrears, and “white” (W) if it also includes other information, such as debt exposure. Credit reports are the
number of credit reports issued by all the credit bureaus in the country (if available); otherwise, by the
credit bureaus responding in that country.
Country Starting Date Type of Information
Shared
Credit Reports:
Level / Percent of Population
(year)
Argentina 1950 B-W 1.2 / 3.4
(1997)
Australia 1930 B 5.8 / 34.0
(1990)
Austria 1860 B-W N/A.
Belgium 1987 B 10.6 / 104.8
(1998)
Brazil 1996 B 200.0 / 128.3
(1997)
Canada 1919 B-W 24.0 / 82.7
(1998)
Chile 1990 B-W 7.0 / 49.3
(1997)
Denmark 1971 B 2.6 / 50.3
(1996)
Finland 1900 B 3.5 / 70.2
(1990)
France none




Hong Kong 1982 B N/A.15
Table 1. - Continued
Country Starting Date Type of Information
Shared
Credit Reports, Level / Percent
of Population
(year)
India N/A. N/A. N/A.
Ireland 1963 B-W 0.8 / 22.5
(1996)
Israel none
Italy 1990 B-W 2.6 / 4.6
(1996)




Mexico 1997 N.A. N.A.
Netherlands 1965 B-W 9.8 / 64.1
(1996)
New Zealand N/A. B N/A.
Nigeria none
Norway 1987 B 0.5 / 12
(1990)
Pakistan none
Peru 1995 B-W N/A.
Philippines 1982 B N/A.
Portugal N/A. B-W N/A.
Singapore 1978 B N/A.
South Africa 1901 B-W N/A.
South Korea 1985 B-W N/A.
Spain 1994 B N/A.
Sri Lanka none
Sweden 1890 B-W 2.2 / 26.0
(1990)
Switzerland 1968 B-W 1.7 / 24.1
(1997)





1960 B-W 60.0 / 104.8
(1989)
Uruguay 1950 B N/A.
United States 1890 B-W 600.0 / 228.1
(1997)
Venezuela N/A. N/A. N/A.
Zimbabwe none16
Our questionnaires also elicit qualitative information on the structure and evolution of
the credit bureau industry, that is not reported in the table. In most countries there is a strong
concentration. A few countries have just one large credit bureau (Australia, Germany,
Argentina, Brazil, Finland, and Ireland). In the U.S., U.K., and Japan competition is limited to
two or three large vendors. This process of concentration is relatively recent. Where the
industry has the longest history (e.g., in the U.S.), it began with local credit bureaus,
progressively merging into larger entities. This reflects economies of scale (the larger the credit
bureau, the more complete and accurate its information), as well as recent advances in
information technology and the elimination of barriers between local credit markets. In the
early 1990s concentration began to extend beyond national boundaries: the top three U.S.
bureaus (Equifax, Experian and Trans Union) acquired national credit bureaus throughout in
Latin America and in parts of Europe and Asia.
The questionnaires also gather information on ownership structure. In the U.S., Brazil
and Argentina the major credit bureaus are for-profit operations owned by private
entrepreneurs, although there are also several local non-profit bureaus owned by chambers of
commerce or merchants’ associations. In Japan and in most of Europe, credit bureaus are
typically incorporated as private companies owned by a consortium of lenders. In Finland and
Belgium, they are operated or licensed by government agencies. With the process of cross-
border acquisitions of local credit bureaus, especially by the large U.S. vendors, the industry is
becoming increasingly profit-oriented.
The international differences in the presence and activity of credit bureaus have several
complementary explanations. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) document that the number of credit
reports per capita are largest where household mobility is highest. This accords with the idea
that the benefit of establishing a credit bureau is greatest where each bank is confronted by a
large number of unknown customers, which is the case in countries where borrowers are very
mobile.
Fear of competition may also inhibit information sharing. When lenders agree to supply
data to a credit bureau they lose the monopoly power attached to exclusive customer
information, unless they are well protected by other barriers to entry. So lenders’ incentives to
pool information are greater when local credit markets are segmented by regulation, as in the
United States, than when banks are free to compete nationwide, as in most European
countries.
A further element that has historically affected the development of credit bureaus is the
degree of privacy protection accorded prospective borrowers. The activities of credit bureaus
are regulated almost everywhere so as to prevent violation of privacy and civil liberties.
Privacy laws contemplate a wide range of consumer guarantees, such as limits on access to
files by potential users, bans on white information (e.g., in Finland and Australia), compulsory
elimination of individual files after a set time (7 years in the United States, 5 in Australia), bans
on gathering certain kinds of information (race, religion, political views, etc.) and right to
access, check and correct one’s own file.
6
                                               
6 As far as access limits are concerned, there appear to be three levels of privacy protection. The replies to our
questionnaire indicate that there are low-protection countries, such as Argentina, where anyone can access
all debtors’ data regardless of the purpose of investigation. In such medium-protection countries as the
United States, data can be accessed only for an “admissible purpose”, essentially the granting of credit. A
higher level of privacy protection may be embodied in the further requirement of the borrower’s explicit17
A final element bearing on the development of credit bureaus is the degree of
protection of creditor rights. Where the legal and judicial systems give poor protection to
creditors, debtors may be tempted to default on their obligations even when they have the
means to repay. As we argue in Section 2, credit bureaus can attenuate moral hazard in credit
relations, by creating a private disciplinary system in place of defective public sanctions.
3.2. Corporate Loans
The information needed to assess the creditworthiness of companies is by its very
nature more complex and less standardized than for households. Therefore in the case of
business loans credit bureaus generally take a more active role in the production of
information, collating credit market data received from lenders and suppliers together with
balance sheet data and information from the company itself and from public sources about
shareholders and managers. The positive component of a credit report for a company is
typically much larger than for an individual, and the nature of the credit bureaus in this market
segment is different. Rather than provide standard credit reports and statistical risk
management, here credit bureau become rating agencies, gathering and processing information
from a variety of sources, including lenders and suppliers.
This very active role in the production, processing, and marketing of information may
explain why the credit agencies that treat corporate loans are typically profit-oriented
businesses, not lenders’ cooperative arrangements. The largest of these agencies worldwide is
Dun & Bradstreet (D&B). Formed in 1933 through the merger of two credit reporting
agencies (R. G. Dun  & Co., formed in 1841, and the Bradstreet Company), today D&B
maintains a global database that covers 48 million businesses, 10 million of them in the United
States. It provides a wide range of services, from the assessment of credit risk and suppliers’
reliability to the management of credit and accounts receivables. A standard D&B business
information report (available online via the Internet) contains payment history, financial
condition, business history, management experience, details on lines of business, parent
company and subsidiaries, public records, etc.
4.  Public Credit Registers
All countries have public registers for real estate collateral (mortgages) to protect the
seniority rights of collateralized creditors, and bankruptcy information is publicly disseminated
to alert present creditors and potential new lenders.
7 These can be considered as basic forms of
publicly enforced information sharing. But in several countries government authorities have
taken a much more active role in fostering the exchange of information between lenders,
                                                                                                                                                  
consent to access his file. This principle is enshrined in the legislation of several European countries and in
the Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament  on “the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data”. In some countries (such as France,
Israel and Thailand) safeguards for consumer privacy are so strong that regulation has impeded the
emergence of private credit bureaus.
7  In some countries, public registers also exist for unpaid IOUs and tax liens.18
creating formal public credit registers (PCRs), which operate in many respects like credit
bureaus.
The PCRs are managed by central banks (except in Chile, Costarica and Peru, where
they are operated by the banking supervisory authorities, and in Finland, where it is contracted
out to a private company). Access to the PCR is granted only to authorized central bank staff
(mainly for surveillance reasons and under tight confidentiality rules) and to the reporting
financial institutions.
8 This creates a two-way flow of data between credit grantors and the
PCR, much as in the case of private credit bureaus.
The key difference from credit bureaus is that participation in the PCR is compulsory,
and its rules are not contracted, but imposed by regulation (except in Finland and Sri Lanka,
where participation is voluntary). This implies a second important difference, namely that
PCRs have universal coverage (all loans above a threshold amount must be reported at
specified intervals), but the information consists mainly of credit data and is disseminated in
consolidated form (total loan exposure of each borrower, no details on individual loans).
Credit bureaus are less complete in coverage but offer details on individual loans and merge
credit data with other data.
Table 2 sets forth the main characteristics of PCRs around the world, based on a
questionnaire submitted to 49 central banks, of which 46 have responded (for the
questionnaire, see the Appendix); 19 operate a PCR and 27 do not. PCRs are common in
continental Europe and Latin America, absent in Anglo-Saxon countries. Most have been
created in the last two decades, except for Germany (1934), Italy (1964) and Mexico (1964).
The newcomers are mostly located in Latin America.
9
The table also shows that the data reported vary considerably across countries. For
instance, in Argentina lenders are required to report data on defaults, arrears, loan exposure,
interest rates and guarantees. In Germany, only loan exposure and guarantees are reported; in
Belgium, only defaults and arrears.
PCRs invariably specify a reporting threshold, but this varies considerably. In most of
Europe, PCRs effectively collect information only on relatively large loans to businesses, but in
Belgium and France they also cover consumer loans. The threshold is highest in Germany and
lowest in Belgium. Clearly, the higher the threshold set by regulators, the fewer the borrowers
covered and the credit reports issued, as we see in Table 2. The threshold also demarcates the
segment in which private credit bureaus operate without competition from the PCR: above the
threshold, credit bureaus have to take into account that lenders can also turn to the public
register’s reports.
                                               
8  In Argentina and Finland not only financial institutions but also the general public can access the PCR. In
Chile the data are also made available to a private credit bureau. In Israel and Greece a database on large
loans is collected for supervisory reasons only by the central bank, but this information is not made
available externally.
9  Hong Kong is currently setting up a PCR.19
Table 2
Public Credit Registers around the World
Figures are based on a questionnaire sent to central banks. The data reported to the register are
defaulted loans (D), arrears (A), total loan exposure (L), interest rates (R), and guarantees (G). The






































Bolivia 1989 N/A. 1,300,000 0 D, A, L, R, G,
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Israel 1975 15,000 N/A. 169,500 D,L20
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Venezuela 1980s N/A. N/A. 0 D, A, L
Zimbabwe none21
A major emerging problem for PCRs is posed by the growing integration of national
credit markets, particularly within the European Union. As of 1998, PCRs are strongly if not
exclusively oriented to their respective domestic markets. For instance, Italian banks are
required to report to the Italian PCR loans made by their foreign branches. But these loans are
not reported to the host-country PCRs. Similarly, Italian companies can borrow abroad
without being reported to the Italian PCR. The integration of capital markets thus implies that
PCRs are losing the capacity to provide full, accurate and reliable information on the overall
credit situation.
Efforts made by the EC commission to set up an international credit reporting system
have not met with success so far owing to the differences between systems which are already in
place in the individual countries and the fact that countries without a central credit register are
unwilling to set up a credit reporting system at the national level. However, European PCRs
are planning to establish cooperative agreements to provide lenders with cross-border
information. As the legal requirements for this exchange of information have not been met by
all EU countries, and since technical and organizational problems have not been solved, it is
not possible to say when this cooperation will become effective. In the longer run, it is well
possible that the PCRs will be gradually displaced by the growth of private, multinational credit
bureaus. Since only eight EU countries have PCRs and even they find it difficult to agree on a
common set of rules, the second outcome seems more likely.
10
5. The Effect of Information Sharing on Bank Lending
The data described in Sections 3 and 4 can be used to relate bank lending to measures
of the activity of credit bureaus and public credit registers, such as their presence, the quality
of information collected, and the number of years they have been in operation. This exercise
poses several data problems. First, missing values and non-responses limit the number of
countries for which we have data on information sharing. Second, data on default rates are
hard to collect and compare internationally. Third, one must control for other legal and
institutional determinants of lending and defaults, and these variables are only available for a
few countries.
There is also a causality issue. Theoretical models show that information sharing may
increase lending and reduce defaults. The same models, however, also suggest that where
credit is more abundant lenders have a stronger incentive to set up a credit bureau. In our
empirical analysis, we attempt to overcome the econometric problems posed by the
endogeneity of information sharing by relating credit market performance to lagged measures
of the quality and intensity of information sharing.
                                               
10  In fact, it may be already occurring: in October 1998, the main Italian credit bureau (CRIF) announced a
link-up with other European credit bureaus.22
Table 3
Information Sharing and Credit Market Performance: Descriptive Statistics
Countries are divided according to the type of information exchanged via private credit bureaus or
public credit registers, based on Tables 1 and 2. Black Information Only is 1 if prior to 1994 private
credit bureaus and/or PCRs exchange black information, and 0 otherwise. Black and White Information
is 1 if prior to 1994 credit bureaus or PCRs exchange black and white information. The Bank Lending -
GDP ratio is the ratio of bank claims on the private sector to GDP in 1994-95. The Credit  Risk
Indicator is based on the International Country Risk Guide Financial Indicator (ICRGF), and ranges
from 0 to 50 (maximum risk). The total number of observations for Credit Risk is 35. See the Appendix
for sources and definition of other variables. Country included are: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,












Bank Lending / GDP (%) 60.53 31.10 67.57 66.42
Credit  Risk 7.77 15.20 5.11 7.14
Log GDP 7.19 5.96 6.77 7.79
GDP Growth Rate (%) 3.45 4.53 2.87 3.38
Rule of Law 7.24 4.80 8.14 7.59
Creditor Rights 2.15 3.14 2.20 1.83
French Origin 0.40 0.43 0.20 0.48
German Origin 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.22
Scandinavian Origin 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.04
English Origin 0.37 0.57 0.50 0.26
Number of observations 40 7 10 2323
The first row of Table 3 reports the ratio between bank lending to the private sector
and GDP in a sample of 40 countries. Data refer to 1994-95. The countries are divided into
three groups, depending on whether prior to 1994 (i) no private credit bureau existed, (ii) only
black information was exchanged, or (iii) both black and white information was shared. Bank
lending is about twice as large in countries where information is shared, irrespective of the type
of information exchanged. However, the correlation may be spurious: information sharing is
found in countries with higher GDP per capita, better law enforcement and poorer safeguards
for creditor rights, variables that may well themselves be correlated with bank lending. To
control for their effect on bank lending, we turn to regression analysis.
To explain international differences in bank lending, we regress the ratio of bank
lending to GDP on the log of output in 1994-95, the growth rate of output in 1970-93, and
indicators of rule of law, creditor rights and legal origin of the commercial code of each
country (see the appendix for sources and definitions). We use a baseline specification similar
to that used by La Porta et al. (1997) and by Levine (1998), who find that the breadth of the
credit market is positively correlated with good law enforcement and protection of creditor
rights. They also find that the historical origins of national legal systems are associated with
significant differences in lending activity: French (civil law) and Scandinavian systems are
associated with a lower ratio of private debt to GNP than English (common law) and German
systems. La Porta et al. (1997) measure the size of the credit market by the sum of bank debt
of the private sector and outstanding non-financial bonds divided by GNP, while Levine (1998)
uses bank lending from 1976 to 1993. We also focus on bank lending only, because credit
bureaus and PCRs can be expected to affect primarily banks’ policies. Information on bond
issuers is instead produced by credit rating agencies and generally publicly available.
Column 1 of Table 4 presents the estimates of the baseline specification for the 40
countries for which we have complete records. The estimates confirm previous findings that
rule of law and creditor rights are important determinants of bank lending. In the specification
of column 2 we add two variables intended to proxy for the quality of information sharing. The
first variable equals 1 if either private credit bureaus, PCRs or both exchange only black
information, and 0 otherwise. The second equals 1 if either private credit bureaus, PCRs or
both exchange black as well as white information. As discussed in Section 2, black information
alone may have a disciplinary effect on borrowers, but the availability of both black and white
information enhances the banks’ screening ability.
Both coefficients are positive and that of black and white information is statistically
different from zero at the 2 percent level. The point estimates indicate that information sharing
increases bank lending by more than 20 percent of GDP. In column 3 we add the legal origin
dummies to the list of regressors. Due to the correlation between creditor rights and legal
origin and to the fewer degrees of freedom, the coefficients of the creditor rights variable and
the information sharing dummies are now less precisely estimated. We further check our results
by using an estimator which is robust to the presence of influential values, and report the
results in columns 4 and 5. The two dummies for information sharing are both statistically
different from zero at the 1 percent significance level.24
Table 4
Effect of Information Sharing on Bank Lending  / GDP
Bank Lending to GDP is the ratio of bank claims on the private sector to GDP in 1994-95. Black
Information Only is 1 if prior to 1994 private credit bureaus and/or PCRs exchange black information,
and 0 otherwise. Black and White Information is 1 if prior to 1994 credit bureaus or PCRs exchange
black and white information. See the Appendix for sources and definition of other variables. White-
corrected standard errors are used in the OLS estimates. Robust regressions first calculate Huber
weights based on absolute residuals and then regresses again until convergence using those weights. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. The list of countries is reported in the note to Table 3.
Variable Ordinary Least Squares Robust Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
















































































Adjusted R square 0.46 0.50 0.67 -.- -.-
Number of observations 40 40 40 40 4025
We also experimented with a variable counting the number of years from the
establishment of the earliest bureau of which we have knowledge. This variable is based on the
assumption that time in existence may correlate with the size of the industry’s data bases and
the reliability of its storage and processing techniques. The coefficient of this variable is not
significantly different from zero (regressions are not reported for brevity).
In principle, private credit bureaus may impact credit markets differently compared to
public credit registers. As explained in Section 4, PCRs have universal coverage but provide
more aggregated data compared to credit bureaus and collect data only for loans above a
statutory threshold. We test for this differential impact by adding separate dummies for
information exchanged by credit bureaus. The coefficients of these variables (not reported for
brevity) are not significantly different from zero. This suggests that private and public
information sharing arrangements are substitutes, an issue that will be further investigated in
Section 7.
6. The Effect of Information Sharing on Defaults
Testing the theoretical prediction that information sharing will lower default rates is
complicated by the unavailability of internationally comparable data on defaults. The fraction of
non-performing loans is hard to compare across countries, because of international differences
in the definition of a non-performing loan. Moreover, this variable cannot be found for many
countries.
11 The proportion of loan loss provisions is an even less reliable measure of the
default rate. Loan loss provisions are not only distorted by differences between national
accounting standards and prudential banking regulations, but also by their highly discretionary
nature: to a large extent, banks can decide how much to allocate to provisions in anticipation
of future losses.
We believe that a survey-based measure of credit risk obtained from an homogeneous
sample of respondents can be a more reliable proxy for the default rate, and therefore rely on
the “credit risk” indicator based on the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) survey of
leading international bankers. Aside from its international comparability, this indicator has the
advantage of being based on ex-ante attitudes of potential lenders. The ICRG credit risk
measure is a composite, equal-weighted indicator of five types of financial risk. Respondents
are asked to rate the risk of loan default or restructuring, delayed payment of suppliers’ credits,
repudiation of contracts by governments, losses from exchange controls, and expropriation of
private investments. Therefore the shortcoming of this proxy is that it is imperfectly correlated
with the likelihood of default on bank loans, since it also reflects other risks. We rescale the
variable so that it ranges from 0 to 50 (maximum risk). (See the Appendix for details and
sources of both indicators.)
                                               
11   Non-performing loans are available only for a very limited number of countries in the balance sheets data of
the IBCA BankScope data set. In our case, this would reduce the sample size to 18 observations, only 1 of
which refers to a country without any form of information sharing.
12   Non-performing loans are available only for a very limited number of countries in the balance sheets data of
the IBCA BankScope data set. In our case, this would reduce the sample size to 18 observations, only 1 of
which refers to a country without any form of information sharing.26
The descriptive evidence in the second row of Table 3 reveals that countries where
information is shared have lower than average credit risk. In Table 5 we investigate if the
descriptive evidence is confirmed by regression analysis.
Table 5
Effect of Information Sharing on Credit Risk
The Credit Risk Indicator is based on the International Country Risk Guide Financial Indicator
(ICRGF), and ranges from 0 to 50 (maximum risk). Black Information Only is 1 if prior to 1994 private
credit bureaus and/or PCRs exchange black information, and 0 otherwise. Black and White Information
is 1 if prior to 1994 credit bureaus or PCRs exchange black and white information. See the Appendix
for sources and definition of other variables. White-corrected standard errors are used in the OLS
estimates. Robust regressions first calculate Huber weights based on absolute residuals and then
regresses again until convergence using those weights. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Countries included are the same as in the note to Table 3 except: Egypt, Israel, Kenya, Sri Lanka,
Uruguay.
Variable Ordinary Least Squares Robust Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)






































































R square 0.78 0.84 -.- -.-
Number of observations 35 35 35 3527
The OLS estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 indicate that slow GDP growth rate
and poor rule of law predict higher credit risk. The coefficients of the information sharing
dummies are large and negative, and significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level or
better. The presence of information sharing in these regressions reduces credit risk by 3 or 4
points, between one third and one half of the sample average of credit risk (7.77 from Table 3).
However, the size and precision of the coefficient estimates are attenuated in the robust
regressions of columns 3 and 4. The explanatory power of the regressions is unchanged if we
add separate indicators for information provided by private credit bureaus. We take this as
evidence for the substitutability of private and public information sharing arrangements.
The results of this section indicate that default rates are negatively correlated with
information sharing indicators. The effect is economically significant, but not always precisely
estimated, since its statistical significance varies depending on the estimation method.
7. Substitution between Private and Public Information Sharing Arrangements
The previous two sections reveal that information sharing improves credit market
performance but that private and public information sharing arrangements have no differential
effects. One way to interpret this finding is that public credit registers and private credit
bureaus are substitutes. If this is true, in countries where credit bureaus are already present the
benefit of establishing a public credit register is negligible. Conversely, its benefit should be
high where credit bureaus are absent, other things equal.
In this section we investigate whether the absence of private credit bureaus prompts
regulators to establish public credit registers or to widen the scope of their operation. If PCRs
are created to remedy the failure of private credit bureaus to arise, the pre-existence of a credit
bureau should be negatively related to the presence of a PCR.
In testing for this relationship, one should control for the severity of moral hazard in
the credit market. As discussed in Section 2, in the presence of moral hazard information
sharing mechanisms increase borrowers’ incentives to repay, and they can lead to a welfare
gain.
13 Therefore, if credit bureaus fail to arise spontaneously (say, because of coordination
problems), the case for the creation of a PCR by a regulator is particularly strong in countries
in which debtors’ opportunistic behavior plagues credit relations and where institutions afford
a weaker protection to creditor rights. We control for these factors using the rule-of-law index
and the creditor rights variable in La Porta at al. (1997).
                                               
13 Padilla and Pagano (1999) show that, if these mechanisms are appropriately designed, borrowers’ effort to
perform is closer to the socially optimum level.28
Table 6
Determinants of the Presence of Public Credit Registers
Countries are divided according to the presence of public credit registers, based on Table 2. Presence of
a PCR is 1 if the register is operating in 1998, 0 otherwise. Pre-existence of a Private Credit Bureau is 1
if at least one private credit bureau was in operation before the establishment of the PCR, 0 otherwise.
Other data are taken from La Porta et al. (1998). See the Appendix for sources and definition of the
variables. In the probit regressions the dependent variable is the presence of a PCR prior to 1998 (see
Table 2). In the Tobit regression the dependent variable is the PCR minimum reporting threshold (see
Table 2). The probit coefficients indicate the effect of the variable on the probability of establishment of
a PCR. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Countries included in the probit estimation are the same
as in Table 3 plus Colombia, India and Taiwan. Countries included in the Tobit estimation are the same
as in Table 3 plus India and Taiwan and excluding Uruguay.
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Total Sample PCR Present PCR Absent
Creditor Rights 2.14 1.59 2.50
Rule of Law 7.08 6.67 7.34
Pre-existence of a Private Credit Bureau 0.51 0.29 0.65
English Origin 0.38 0.12 0.54
French Origin 0.39 0.71 0.19
German Origin 0.14 0.11 0.15
Scandinavian Origin 0.09 0.06 0.12
Number of observations 43 17 26
Panel B. Regression results
Variable Probit Regressions Tobit Regressions







































Number of observations 43 43 41 4129
The correlations between these variables are displayed in Table 6. The conditional
averages in Panel A show that a private credit bureau already existed in only 30 percent of the
countries where there is a PCR, against 65 percent where there is none. Also, PCRs tend to be
formed in countries where creditor rights are less protected (1.59 versus 2.50) and there is less
respect for the law (the rule of law variable is 6.67 against 7.34). They are also more likely to
be found in countries whose legal system derives from the French civil code tradition (the
French-origin dummy is 0.71 against 0.19).
To test the statistical significance of these relations, we estimate Probit regressions
where the presence of a PCR is the dependent variable. The results, displayed in columns 1 and
2 of Panel B, show that the probability of the presence of a PCR is significantly and negatively
related to the pre-existence of a credit bureau. The coefficient indicates that pre-existence of a
private credit bureau raises the probability of establishing a PCR by 40 percent. If the legal
origin dummies are not introduced in the Probit regression, the creditor-rights variable also
appears with a negative and significant coefficient. When the origin dummies are added as
explanatory variables in column 2, the coefficient of creditor rights is still negative but not
precisely estimated, whereas the French-origin dummy takes a large, positive and statistically
significant coefficient. The reason is that creditor rights has a strong negative correlation with
French origin; that is, the countries whose legal system is rooted in the French civil code are
also those that afford the weakest legal protection to creditors. Finally, the coefficient of the
rule-of-law variable is close to zero.
As we saw in Section 4, a key parameter in the design of a PCR is the threshold above
which data on loans must be reported by credit institutions. The higher the threshold, the more
accurate and comprehensive the account of past credit history that the PCR can provide to
lenders. Therefore the threshold effectively measures the boundaries of the PCR operation.
In columns 3 and 4 we report estimates of Tobit regressions where the threshold -
measured in thousands of US dollars - is related to the same set of regressors as in Probit
regressions. The reason for using Tobit rather than OLS estimation is that the threshold is not
defined in countries where there is no PCR. For these countries, we set the threshold at an
arbitrarily large positive number. As a result, the distribution of the dependent variable features
upper truncation. The pattern of results is similar to that of the Probit regressions, once one
takes into account that in this case the signs are predicted to be opposite. In particular, the pre-
existence of a private credit bureau raises the threshold by about ten million U.S. dollars. Since
obviously no existing PCR has such enormous threshold, the interpretation of this number is
that pre-existence of a credit bureau effectively discourages the creation of a PCR.
In summary, the historical experience is consistent with the hypothesis that the
establishment of PCRs has been largely motivated by the “substitution” role.  First, they have
often been created to make up for the lack of private credit bureaus. Where the market alone
has not produced information sharing, governments have felt they had to take the initiative.
Second, PCRs have been introduced to compensate, at least partly, for the weak protection
that the state offered to creditors’ interests, and thus to remedy heightened moral hazard in
lending.30
8. Conclusions
In many countries lenders communicate data concerning their customers’
creditworthiness to one another or can access databases that help them assess credit applicants.
However, the type, quality, and quantity of data available, and information-sharing mechanism,
vary greatly. Often lenders agree to exchange of information spontaneously, via information
brokers such as credit bureaus. In other cases they are obliged to do so by the authorities via
public credit registers. The empirical literature has not contributed much to our knowledge of
this phenomenon and of its relevance to credit market performance. The predictions of the
theory offer some guidance as to the impact of information sharing on default rates and lending
activity. However, its predictions are partly ambiguous, and therefore the verdict about the
actual impact of information sharing on credit market performance rests with the data.
Here, we systematically document private and public information-sharing arrangements
around the world and analyze their effects on the credit market as well as the reasons for their
emergence. The empirical analysis builds upon a new, specially designed data set mainly
collected via questionnaires. We find that the breadth of credit markets is associated with
information sharing. Total bank lending to the private sector scaled by GNP is larger in
countries where information sharing is more solidly established and intense. This relation
persists even when one controls for other economic and institutional variables, such as country
size and growth rate, and variables capturing respect for law and the protection of creditor
rights. We also find evidence, in accordance with the theory, that defaults are mitigated by
public and private information sharing. This evidence is somewhat weaker, however, perhaps
owing to the quality of our proxy for defaults.
Our data also show that the impact of private arrangements to share credit information
is similar to that of public credit registers. In fact, where private credit registers already
existed, PCRs are less likely to be established. Conversely, governments are likely to step in
with forced information sharing in countries where private information-sharing arrangements
have not arisen. They are also more likely to do so where creditor rights are poorly protected.
We regard this paper as a first step in the empirical analysis of the effects of
information sharing on credit markets. The pervasiveness and intensity of this information
exchange warrants much more thorough inquiry into its effects on the lending policies of banks
and the conduct of borrowers. There is still no microeconomic evidence on this issue. We also
lack accounts of the impact of these arrangements in developing countries, where in many
cases they are just being established.  It is ironic that private credit bureaus and public credit
registers know so much about us while we still know so little about them.31
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Appendix
A1. Definition of variables used in Tables 3 to 6
Bank  Lending Claims of banks on private sector, 1994-95 average. Source:
International Financial Statistics (line 32d).
Credit  Risk The Credit Risk is based on the International Country Risk Guide
Financial Indicator (ICRGF). The indicator is constructed on the basis of
a survey of leading international bankers, who are asked to rate each
country on a scale of 0 to 10 each of the following 5 risks: default or
unfavorable loan restructuring, delayed payment of suppliers’ credits,
repudiation of contracts by governments, losses from exchange controls,
expropriation of private investments. The original index scales from 0 to
50 (maximum creditwothiness). We define Credit Risk as 50 minus the
original index, so that 50 represents maximum risk. Credit Risk refers to
October 1995. Source: Erb et al. (1996), Table 4, Series ICRGF.
Creditor  Rights An index aggregating creditor rights. The index aggregates various
rights that secured creditors might have in bankruptcy, liquidation and
reorganization. Restrictions on the managers’ ability to seek unilateral
protection from creditors, mandatory dismissal of management in
reorganizations, lack of automatic stay on assets, and absolute priority
for secured creditors all contribute to this index. The index ranges from
0 to 4. Source: La Porta et al. (1997).
Log GDP Logarithm of the gross domestic product in 1992-93. Gross Domestic
Product is expressed in 1990 million dollars. Source: International
Financial Statistics, line 99b for GDP and aa for exchange rates.
GDP growth Average annual percent growth of per capita gross domestic product,
for the period 1970-1993. . Source: International Financial Statistics.
Legal Origin Identifies the legal origin (English, German, French, Scandinavian) of
the company law or commercial code of each country. Source: La Porta
et al. (1997).
Rule of Law Assessment of the law-and-order tradition in the country. Average of
the 1982-95 period. Scale from 0 to 10 with lower scores for less
tradition of law and order. Source: La Porta et al. (1997).33
A2. Questionnaire directed to private credit bureaus
Aim of the survey
This questionnaire is part of a research project that aims at understanding the frequency, determinants
and consequences of information sharing arrangements in credit markets. This questionnaire is directed
to managers of credit bureaus.
Confidentiality
The researchers carrying out this project guarantee complete confidentiality in the use of the data
collected in the survey. Data and results based on the survey will always be presented in tabular form
and at a level of aggregation that will safeguard the confidentiality of individual banks.
PLEASE ENCLOSE ANY PUBLISHED OR OFFICIAL MATERIAL THAT YOU FEEL WOULD BE
RELEVANT TO UNDERSTAND THE OPERATION OF CREDIT BUREAUS IN YOUR COUNTRY.
1.  DESCRIPTION OF YOUR CREDIT BUREAU
Town where headquarters is located: ____________
The credit bureau is owned by:
a group of banks
a group of other financial intermediaries
individual share-holders
foreign-owned (majority stake foreign-owned)
The credit bureau is
a company run for profit  
a cooperative enterprise or consortium of lenders
a semi-public institution
other (please indicate)





The credit bureau operates:
at multinational level
at national level
at regional or provincial level34
2. SCALE OF OPERATIONS
Personal sector Business sector
Year started operating
Number of records in your
files in 1990
Number of records in your
files in 1996
Credit reports issued in 1990
Credit reports issued in 1996
Credit reports issued in 1990
as % of all those issued in
your country in that year
Credit reports issued in 1996
as % of those issued in your
country in that year
If the credit bureaus started operating after 1990, please supply information on credit reports and
number of records in the first year of the operation of the credit bureau.
3. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Please rank the importance of the following as sources of information for your credit reports on a
1 to 3 increasing scale:  1 = not used or rather unimportant, 2 = important; 3 = crucially
important.








4.  DATA SUPPLIED BY LENDERS
Which type of data are provided by lenders to your credit bureau?






* For households: employment status, marital status, age, income, assets, etc.; for firms: line of
business, balance sheet data, personal information about directors, share-ownership structure, etc.)
5.   RECIPROCITY
Do you apply a principle of reciprocity with your clients (i.e., do you supply information only to those
who supply it to you)?
YES   NO  
If yes, is there an explicit agreement between you and lenders to exchange information?
YES   NO  
What happens if lenders do not comply with the reciprocity agreement (i.e. supply late or incorrect
information)?
6. CREDIT BUREAUS IN YOUR COUNTRY
Please list the other main credit bureaus that operate in your country:
Please describe briefly the evolution of the credit bureau industry in the last 10 years in your country
(growth and problems of the industry, process of concentration, etc.)
7. PUBLIC CREDIT REGISTERS
Please indicate if a Public Credit Register exists in your country and, if so, how it affects your
operations. (By a P.C.R. we mean a publicly managed database, which forcibly collects data about
loans from banks to supply it under request from other banks.)
8. PRIVACY LAWS
If laws protecting consumer privacy exist in your country, what do they require?
How do these laws affect the operation of your company?36
A3. Questionnaire directed to Central Banks
This questionnaire is part of a research project that aims at understanding the frequency, determinants
and consequences of information sharing arrangements in credit markets. By Public Credit Register we
mean a public database managed by the Central Bank or some other government institution, which
forcibly collects information about loans from banks and makes it available under request from other
banks via credit reports.
1.  MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC CREDIT REGISTER (PCR)
Is the PCR operated by the Central Bank or by another Government agency (please indicate)?
2. ACTIVITY
Year in which the PCR was established
Number of subjects in the file of the PCR
Number of credit reports issued by the PCR to banks and other
lending institutions in 1997 (1996 if not available)
Minimum reporting threshold (specify currency units)
Lenders required to supply data (banks, finance companies, etc.)
Is participation compulsory? (yes/no)












5. PRIVATE CREDIT BUREAUS
Please list the names of the private credit bureaus that operate in your country.
6. PRIVACY LAWS
Please mention if privacy laws exist and, if so, how they affect the operations of the PCR and of private
credit bureaus (add pages if necessary).